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 variant of cost-plus contracting be em-
 ployed. Therefore, it is important that we
 possess a highly developed ability to es-
 timate the likely cost of achieving the de-
 sired technological advance. This study
 began by examining the techniques cur-
 rently available for costing SOA extension
 contracts by surveying the literature deal-
 ing explicitly with SOA measurement and
 costing. The focus of the study was to
 develop a model that is demonstrably
 workable for both cost prediction and cost
 control.
 Command and Control Test Bed
 Evaluation of Man's Role(s) in Strategic
 Defense. Allen , Marsha K., TRW De-
 fense Systems Group, One Space Park,
 Redondo Beach, CA 90278.
 Man's role in command and control is a
 key issue requiring new and unique meth-
 odology and models to identify and eval-
 uate all aspects of human participation.
 TRW developed, and is experimenting
 with, a C2 simulation center providing a
 realistic environment to support interac-
 tive evaluation of man's role in SDS.
 Adding Soldiers to Firepower Models.
 Van Nostrand, Sally J US Army Con-
 cepts Analysis Agency, 8120 Woodmont
 Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797.
 This study evaluated human perform-
 ance data to determine whether soldier fac-
 tor and performance algorithms (per-
 gorithms) should be added to present com-
 bat models. The paper summarizes avail-
 able data, demonstrates differences in
 model output caused by human perform-
 ance data, and discusses additional data
 needed to turn firepower models into mod-
 els of combat.
 Analysis Support to JOPES/WIS.
 Flury, William /?., Defense Systems
 Group, SRA, Inc., 901 S. Highland
 Street, Arlington, VA
 The Joint Operation Planning and Ex-
 ecution System (JOPES) is a system-of-
 sy stems that integrates reporting systems,
 data bases, analytic procedures, and ADP
 support of several hundred independently
 operated C systems. Data and analytic
 capabilities are widely distributed in the
 system. Analytic support control is main-
 tained through procedures design control
 and data standards. S
 HUGHES VIEWS
 Worth Reading - "And I Was
 There": Pearl Harbor and
 Midway - Breaking the Secrets
 Rear Admiral Edwin T. Lay ton, USN
 (Ret) with
 Captain Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret)
 and
 John Costello
 William Morrow and Company, New
 York , 1985.
 "And I Was There" is a personal
 memoire of then commander Ed Layton
 when he was staff intelligence officer at
 CincPacFlt before and during World War
 II. Layton 's book is the latest of the books
 about "scouting" through code breaking
 that have become possible since the de-
 classification of intelligence records that
 commenced around 1975. It is one of the
 best. What sets it apart are its rich details of
 campaign planning (operational art for
 Army readers). Admiral Nimitz stands out
 as the titan that he was, and this reader, at
 least, gained a new appreciation of how
 closely he tied himself to the battle plans
 themselves. Nimitz's role is in the history
 books, but Layton 's intimate picture of the
 unfolding events casts doubts on the con-
 ventional wisdom that our tactical com-
 mand was uniquely at sea, while the
 Japanese (Yamamoto in particular) issued
 tactical orders from ashore. Command
 philosophies of the two opponents looks
 far more symmetrical as Layton describes
 them. Although we always put the officer
 in tactical command (OTC) afloat with his
 forces, in practice the operational com-
 mander at Pearl Harbor had a pervasive
 influence because he could communicate
 while the OTC was under radio silence
 during the vital deployments before the
 action broke loose. In addition, the crucial
 tactical intelligence, heavily dependent on
 cryptanalysis, necessarily was with
 Nimitz.
 A large slice of the book covers the
 warm-ups to Pearl Harbor. Layton natural-
 ly sides with his boss, Admiral Kimmel.
 He has an additional ax to grind, which is
 the feud between the intelligence es-
 tablishment at headquarters (OP-20-G)
 and his own tiny handful of guys (with Joe
 Rochefort figuring prominently, of
 course) in the field. 1 did not find Layton 's
 firm pro-Pearl Harbor bias oppressive, but
 at the same time I did not agree with him
 (and Pineau and Costello, of course) that
 all the black hats were worn in Washing-
 ton. Like all the other post mortems,
 Layton's memory of the events surround-
 ing the Japanese surprise attack take on
 focus through a narrow lens in isolation
 from the surrounding activities, both at
 Pearl and at the seat of government.
 Layton's description of the buildup to
 the climatic Japanese strike is probably
 deadly accurate. It is apparent that there
 was too much warning from Washington
 at the wrong time and not enough at the
 right time. The CNO, Admiral Stark,
 took for granted that Kimmel knew what
 Washington knew, and that Kimmel was
 getting ready for war. Kimmel was indeed
 very busy getting ready for wartime op-
 erations: ironically the resulting heavy op-
 erating schedule was a scarcely noticed
 part of the problem. He and General Short
 were not oblivious to the possibility of an
 attack on Pearl Harbor, but they were short
 of scouts (one always is) and their aircraft
 were looking in the wrong direction. In
 addition, the search effort was diluted over
 time. The definitive signal, the war warn-
 ing of November 25, was twelve days be-
 fore the surprise attack.
 Nor was OP-20-G with its richeij^k
 cryptanalytic resources looking for op-^^
 erational clues the way Layton says he
 would have done, and which he shows
 were available in hindsight. Neither Stark
 nor his Washington intelligence officer
 had concrete information to make the Pearl
 Harbor attack more than a remote possibil-
 ity. There were no facts - only ex post
 facto clues - about Yamamoto' s op-
 erationally audacious but strategically
 foolhardy attack. Yamamoto's target
 might or might not have been deducible,
 but Washington's intelligence agenda was
 too broad, and Pearl's resources were too
 narrow.
 Layton for his part does not appreciate
 that the CNO's role was to get the whole
 navy ready: war plans, coordination with
 the Army, mobilization, liaison with the
 British, prodding the Congress, reviewing
 ship designs and the shipbuilding pro-
 gram, that sort of thing. Stark, with
 Roosevelt's confidence, was pursuing the
 navy's strategic interests effectively. J.J.
 Schneider has a nice little piece he uses at^
 the School of Advanced Military Studies^^J
 Ft. Leavenworth, on the subject of US war
 planning and preparation. Schneider first
 quotes John Keegan: "Washington
 PHALANX 22 September 1988
This content downloaded from 205.155.65.226 on Sun, 19 Apr 2020 20:22:25 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 allowed Pearl Harbor to come round with-
 out having made any better provision for
 harnessing the energies of government to
 strategy." Because of "America's un-
 »reparedness for war at every moment up
 to Pearl Harbor," it therefore became
 necessary for President Franklin
 Roosevelt "to improvise in exactly the
 same was as Abraham Lincoln . . . and
 Woodrow Wilson." Schneider then pro-
 ceeds to demolish Keegan's assertion for
 the myth that it was. A strategic plan was
 approved (specifically Rainbow 5), the
 draft was in effect, ships were building,
 the industrial base was gearing up, and all
 done against what was an extraordinarily
 difficult isolationist climate.
 Stark had his strategic responsibilities;
 Kimmel had his operational responsibili-
 ties, foremost of which was the combat
 readiness of his fleet, which included its
 survival. (The purpose of an army not en-
 gaged is to survive, wrote our mentor,
 Clausewitz.)
 There is a lesson for the 1990s, of
 course. It is that the strategic warning sys-
 tems must not be too firmly in the hands of
 the strategists. Yes, covert knowledge
 must remain covert, but the very crisis
 kitself tightens the screws on the lid; Layton
 ^makes that as vivid as can be as he traces
 the paths of the couriers in the nation's
 capital on their limited, but labored,
 rounds. Now as in 1941 , Washington will
 have its own agenda. That hydra head, the
 National Command Authority, will focus
 on its larger responsibilities, as it should.
 At the edge of war, Washington will be-
 lieve it is committing proper and over-
 whelming attention to the crisis, and read-
 iness, and the danger of surprise, and the
 Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee.
 Now as then it will assume, almost without
 thinking about it, that the picture in Wash-
 ington is the picture in Omaha, or in Stutt-
 gart. In the crisis the NC A won't grasp that
 the picture in the field will be shaded dif-
 ferently, and the difference will be crucial.
 Layton 's main complaint was that OP-
 20-G handcuffed CincPacFlt intelligence
 from doing its job: which was to con-
 centrate on operational intelligence, and to
 gather and integrate the clues that would
 govern the fleet's edge of war operations,
 and - in his case - much of the fleet's
 ^survival. He believes he might have put
 the last pieces in place and deduced that
 Nagumo's carriers were coming across
 the North Pacific, for at least as he remem-
 bered it later, he was close to the truth. The
 way intelligence is integrated for strategic
 purposes is not the way it is integrated for
 military operations. That is Layton's les-
 son for the today. 0
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 Winners
 Naval Postgraduate School,
 September 1987
 Design and Implementation of a
 Network Optimizer for Officer
 Assignment During Mobilization
 Stephen H. Rapp
 Captain, United States Marine Corps
 This thesis describes the design and im-
 plementation of a large-scale network op-
 timization model for assigning United
 States Marine Corps officers to billets dur-
 ing mobilization.
 The model has been tested at Headquar-
 ters, USMC, and is slated for installation
 in Fall 1988 as a permanent replacement
 for an existing procedure that has been in
 use since 1978. It improves the turnaround
 time from days to minutes, reduces com-
 putation costs by substantial amounts
 yearly, and, in tests on FY87 exercise
 data, resulted in significantly better alloca-
 tions of the officer pool.
 The network model treats officers with
 similar attributes as supply nodes and bil-
 lets with similar attributes as demand
 nodes. Arcs of the network represent
 potential assignments between supplies
 and demands. Highly detailed information
 obtained from current USMC databases is
 used to specify the attributes of the nodes.
 These attributes (e.g., primary and secon-
 dary military occupational specialties,
 location, grade, type, and sex) are used in
 a battery of screening tests which decide
 whether a particular officer/billet arc is
 allowed to exist in the network. These
 attributes also govern the arch cost func-
 tion, which incorporates a hierarchy of
 objectives: unit fill, billet fit, and reloca-
 tion costs.
 The model is trebly decomposed with
 the most time-critical billets optimized
 first and the least critical last. The three
 optimizations with appropriate interven-
 ing data revisions are conducted in a single
 model run.
 The unclassified thesis closes with a dis-
 cussion of how the mobilization model can
 be redesigned and adapted for peacetime
 use. In peacetime, the constraints and
 criteria of officer assignments differ (e.g. ,
 education and training are considered), but
 the number of officers in need of assign-
 ment at any time is far less than in
 mobilization.
 Co-Advisors: Richard E. Rosenthal
 and Paul R. Milch. For further details,
 contact: CAPT Steven L. Rapp, USMC,
 1259 Spruance Street, Monterey, CA
 93940.
 An Analysis of Submarine Periscope
 Exposure Detection Opportunities (U)
 Robert M. Hennegan
 Lieutenant, United States Navy
 Data from the S HAREM data base is
 analyzed to determine the distribution of
 several parameters associated with sub-
 marine periscope exposure detection
 opportunities. These parameters are: the
 time the submarine spends submerged, the
 time the submarine spends at periscope
 depth, the bearing relative to the surface
 ship on which an initial periscope expo-
 sure occurs, and the range between the
 submarine and the surface ship at the time
 of the initial periscope exposure. Results
 of this analysis are incorporated into a
 FORTRAN program which models sub-
 marine and surface ship interaction during
 the time that a submarine is at periscope
 depth. The probability of the occurrence of
 a visual detection opportunity is calculated
 and the results are presented graphically.
 Classification of thesis: SECRET.
 Advisor: R.N. Forrest, Department of
 Operations Research.
 For further details, contact: LT Robert
 M. Hennegan, USN, Advanced Course,
 Submarine School, New London, Box
 700, Groton, CT 06349-5700.
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